January 2003

Abstract
This report provides a ten-year history of the violent crime rates in the Memphis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and is contrasted with the history of crime trends for the nation. An explanation and discussion of crime reporting mechanisms and their effects on criminal statistics is provided, as well as a brief overview of the theoretical attempts to explain the disproportionate number of young men that is consistently present in an analysis of violent offenders and their victims. This is followed by an editorial discussion of the theoretical foundation of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission’s work in relation to criminal justice policy addressing the criminality and victimization rates of young men. A brief analysis on the possible success of relying on the relative size of the cohort of young men constituting the population base results in the conclusion that, while this may serve as a rough indicator, it has not been established to be reliable or valid, and should be considered only in conjunction with a host of other, well-researched indicators of future crime trends.

Introduction
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines violent crime, for the purposes of composing national statistics in the face of differing jurisdictional criminal definitions, as falling into one of four categories: murder/non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. From 1991 to 2001, the number of reported offenses, nationwide, that fall into these four categories has declined by approximately 33.5%. The national rate for reported murder/non-negligent manslaughter decreased by 42.9%, forcible rape by 24.8%, robbery by 45.5%, and the rate of aggravated assault fell by 26.5% from 1991 to 2001. A review of the aggregate data from all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) across the country reveals a 36.7% decrease in the rate of reported violent crime during this same time period. These national averages, however, are not entirely reflective of the history of violent crime in the Memphis MSA.¹

Many criminological theories have attempted to address the disproportionate presence of young men found in an analysis of violent crime statistics, both as perpetrators and victims. The majority of these theories pivot about the question of why young men are disproportionately represented, yet the fact remains, regardless of why, that young men are reported to commit and fall victim to violent crime at a much higher rate than members of any other single demographic group. Furthermore, these theories commonly recognize the fact that this age/gender cohort, when subdivided into sections defined by such demographic characteristics as race and economic class, varies widely within itself in terms of criminality and violent victimization. This discussion will provide a brief review of the most prominent of these theories as well as an editorial discussion of their applicability to the Memphis MSA’s crime statistics.

The History of Violent Crime in the Memphis MSA (1991-2001)
The Memphis MSA is comprised of five counties: Shelby, Tipton, and Fayette Counties in Tennessee; Crittenden County, Arkansas; and Desoto County, Mississippi. When considering crime data for this area, it is important to remember that MSA’s, in general, were not designed for this purpose, but for census purposes. This means that, just as national crime data consists of statistics from largely rural areas and densely populated cities alike, data for the Memphis MSA is also influenced by these contrasting community types. The criminal profile for southern Desoto County and western Crittenden County is hardly comparable to that of the City of Memphis, yet the statistics for these areas are compiled as one.

An understanding of the methodology used to report and tabulate violent crime rates is essential before any meaningful comparison or analysis may be performed. First, the FBI can only include in their tabulation of violent offenses those offenses that are known to and reported by law enforcement. In short, they can only count the crimes that are counted. This understanding is important for several reasons, not the least of which is the fact that many crimes are never reported nor known to any law enforcement agency, and are therefore never recorded.

Furthermore, changes in the methods by which local agencies report the crimes that are known may drastically affect the resulting statistics. This effect can be quite dramatic. For example, following a ten-year FBI initiative, the Memphis MSA recently joined other jurisdictions in a shift to the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which constituted such a change as to render statistics from previous years (1999 and previous) entirely incomparable to current statistics (2000 and beyond) for this area. A practical example illustrating why current statistics are so different would include a theoretical criminal incident. Consider an incident in which a criminal enters a convenience store in the Memphis area armed with a gun and threatens the store’s clerk and the store’s three customers. The clerk and one of the customers are then robbed by this offender. During the course of these robberies, the assailant shoots two of the victims; one is injured while the other is killed. The offender then flees the scene. Under the previous reporting system, only one crime would have been reported – the murder – as the FBI has historically required that only the most serious offense occurring during any one criminal episode be counted. Under the current NIBRS, however, this type of incident is reported as a murder, two robberies, and three aggravated assaults.² This example should clearly illustrate how changes in reporting mechanisms may drastically change the perceived criminal profile for an area. While the immediate effect of this shift to the NIBRS may be a perceived inflation in crime, as the FBI encourages more and more reporting agencies to submit their data in this more accurate form, criminologists and the public will be provided the opportunity to consider a much clearer picture of crime in their communities.

Acknowledging that the Memphis MSA’s crime data for the years 2000 and 2001 are not statistically comparable to those of previous years (or the crime data of other areas not currently reporting under the NIBRS), a review of the history of violent crime in the Memphis area reveals a much different picture than that painted by the average rates of violent crime for the nation as a whole over the past ten years.³ While the nation experienced a decline of approximately 33.5% in the rate of violent crime from 1991 to 2001, the overall rate of reported violent crime in the Memphis MSA has risen by approximately 6.4%, but again, the 1991 figure and the 2001 figure are not comparable. This lack of statistical comparability would seem to negate the need to explore this ten-year trend, but it has some value, as will be discussed following a review of other violent crime statistics for the Memphis MSA. During this ten-year period, the Memphis MSA rate of reported murder/non-negligent manslaughter fell by approximately 23.9%, forcible rape by 38.2%, and robbery by 14.9%. The rate of aggravated assault in the Memphis MSA is the only violent crime statistic that increased during this period, and it did so by 39.7%. Clearly, the rate of reported aggravated assault accounts for the entirety of the overall increase in reported violent crime for this area.

As stated above, before 2000, the Memphis MSA only reported the most serious offense that occurred during one criminal episode, with murder/non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault being listed in their rank/order of seriousness. As murder/non-negligent manslaughter is always considered the most serious offense and is the offense most likely to be reported to and/or known by law enforcement, this crime’s statistics remain a relatively reliable indicator of violent crime. The fact that the reported rates of forcible rape and robbery decreased in the Memphis MSA, despite the changes in reporting mechanisms, is significant in that this most likely reflects a decrease in the actual number, not just the reported number, of occurrences.

This leaves the reported increase in aggravated assaults. The Memphis MSA’s shift to the NIBRS would dictate that this offense’s rate should increase to some degree, even though the actual number of occurrences may not. This expected rate increase, however, probably does not account for the entirety of the change. The fact remains that the actual number of occurrences of aggravated assault in the Memphis MSA has probably increased, but this does not provide a full explanation, either. Several factors may play a part in this perceived increase. Educated conjecture would examine the effect that regional trauma centers (such as the Regional Medical Center at Memphis) and advances in medical technology has had in turning individuals that would have previously been murder victims into aggravated assault victims just by virtue of saving their lives. Also, recent strategic initiatives focusing specifically on gun violence in the Memphis MSA, while probably not affecting criminals’ willingness to violently victimize others, have perhaps reduced their willingness to use firearms in favor of less dangerous weapons, thereby resulting in fewer murders, but more aggravated assaults. In short, while the actual number of aggravated assaults has probably increased, it has not increased by as much as the statistics would indicate.

The Role of Young Men in Violent Crime
There is little argument among criminologists that young men (roughly defined as aged 13-24 years) are disproportionately represented among the offenders and victims of violent crime. Most of the related research and discussion are focused on the question of why this phenomenon is consistently present in crime data, and there are almost as many explanations, to varying degrees of plausibility, as there are criminologists. Without delving into great detail, the most currently prominent of these theories focus on the routine activities, lifestyles, risk taking behaviors, and criminal opportunities of young men; the strain experienced due to the conflict between social and economic expectations of young men and their limited access to the resources necessary to successfully fulfill those expectations; the differing access to learning opportunities that young men experience that influence the types of crime they commit or do not commit and their overall criminal propensity or lack thereof; and the general lack of self control that is often inherent in youth, immaturity, and erratic hormonal changes.

A commonality present in all of these theories is an effort to produce a "general" criminological theory – that is to say, one that explains all crime, all the time, at least for the demographic group in question. As yet, no general theory has earned widespread support among criminologists, and barring any well-documented consensus, the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission uses a more eclectic approach as the theoretical foundation for its work in criminal justice policy research and analysis, crime prevention/reduction, and communal fear reduction. Each of the most prominent theories that seek to explain the disproportionate rate of criminality and victimization of young men has value, in that at least some of the components that make up each theory are plausible and supported by research, though to varying degrees of rigor. With that said, it is the Commission’s judgment that young men are predisposed to criminality and the risky behaviors that often lead to victimization by virtue of their youthful immaturity, indiscretion, personalities, and biochemistry. Essentially, it is our position that this predisposition (to general manifestations of poor judgment, including criminality and risk-taking behavior) is simply a function of their age; however, this predisposition should not be construed as a predetermination. Other forces and circumstances, among them those falling under the broad headings "socio-economic" and "environmental," serve to mitigate and/or aggravate young men’s predisposition to criminality and victimization, thus resulting in varying degrees of each among demographic subsections of the age cohort. For example, there are marked differences in the rates of criminality and violent victimization between certain divisions of this age/gender cohort. Most commonly, these subsections are defined in terms of race, economic status, access to services and/or resources such as education and mental healthcare, and the physical and social environments in which they live.

Conclusion: Crime as a Function of the Proportion of Young Males in the Population Base
Research has been conducted in an attempt to relate the relative size of the cohort of young men in the population base of the United States to trends found in the national rates of crime, and some positive correlation has been reported; however, it does not seem as though a singular analysis of census demographic predictions is a particularly reliable or valid indicator of future crime trends. It is plausible that, as the relative number of young men making up the population base grows, one may expect crime rates to increase, or at least to decrease less. Unfortunately, this type of simple analysis, even if it could be shown to be a valid and reliable indicator, fails to address the possibly negligible degree to which crime rates may be expected to vary. In short, it is the Commission’s view that there are simply too many variables that have been shown to affect rates of criminality and victimization to definitively state, in good faith, that only the relative size of the cohort of young men constituting the population base is the best, or even a particularly good, predictor of future violent crime trends.

Appendix A - F (Charts)

Appendix F

Recall the theoretical criminal incident recounted on page four of the text:

Consider an incident in which a criminal enters a convenience store in the Memphis area armed with a gun and threatens the store’s clerk and the store’s three customers. The clerk and one of the customers are then robbed by this offender. During the course of these robberies, the assailant shoots two of the victims; one is injured while the other is killed. The offender then flees the scene.

Under the former reporting guidelines, the reporting of this criminal event would be as follows:

Following the current NIBRS guidelines, the reporting of the multiple-offense episode would be as follows:

In an area of the size and population density as the Memphis MSA, these types of multiple-offense episodes generally occur more than once during a reporting year. With that said, a conservative illustration might suggest that 10 such criminal events were to occur in any given year. Again using the NIBRS guidelines, the report would be as follows:

The former system would have reflected the ten murders, but zero robberies and aggravated assaults. Clearly, this difference in reporting mechanisms, particularly after the results of which have compounded over the course of a reporting year, can dramatically affect the perceived criminal profile for the given area.

Notes

1. For graphs comparing the rates of violent crime for the U.S. and the Memphis MSA, please see Appendices A-E.

2. For an illustration as to how this type of example, when compounded over the course of numerous incidents, affects aggregate crime data, please see Appendix F.

3. For graphs comparing the rates of violent crime for the U.S. and the Memphis MSA, please see Appendices A-E.

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